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Abstract
Let L be a language decided by a constant-round Arthur-Merlin (AM) protocol with neg-
ligible soundness error and all but possibly the last message being classical. We prove that if
this protocol is zero knowledge with a black-box, quantum simulator S, then L ∈ BQP . Our
result also applies to any language having a three-round classical interactive proof with negli-
gible soundness error and a black-box quantum simulator. These results in particular disallow
parallel composition of certain protocols in order to reduce soundness error while maintaining
zero knowledge with a black-box quantum simulator, unless BQP = NP . They generalize
analogous classical results of Goldreich and Krawczyk (1990), who showed that when S is a
black-box, classical simulator, then L ∈ BPP .
Our proof goes via a reduction to quantum black-box search. We show that the existence
of a black-box simulator when L /∈ BQP would imply an impossibly-good quantum search
algorithm.
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1 Introduction
Zero-knowledge protocols play a central role in cryptography. Such protocols allow a prover
to convince a verifier that he knows a secret, without disclosing any extra information about
the secret. That is, anything efficiently computable after interacting with the prover could
also have been efficiently computed without the interaction.
Interactive protocols must be secure as well as round-efficient, in practice. For general in-
teractive proofs, parallel composition is widely used to decrease the error probability without
increasing the number of rounds. Therefore, for practical cryptographic applications, one is in-
terested in parallel-composing zero-knowledge protocols while maintaining the zero-knowledge
property.
Goldreich and Krawczyk [GK90] proved a result concerning the round complexity of zero-
knowledge interactive proofs: only BPP languages have three-round interactive proofs with
negligible soundness error which are black-box simulation zero knowledge. This precludes
parallel composition of many of the well-known zero-knowledge protocols – e.g., for Graph
Isomorphism, for Graph 3-Colorability and generally, for allNP [GMW91] – while maintaining
black-box zero knowledge, unless the languages are in BPP. [GK90] also show that for Arthur-
Merlin interactive proofs – in which the verifier’s messages are his fair coin tosses – the above
result can be extended to protocols with any constant number of rounds.
Loosely speaking, we say that an interactive proof deciding a language L is black-box
simulation zero-knowledge if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator which using
any verifier V∗ as a black box, on inputs in L produces a probability distribution which is
indistinguishable from the distribution of conversations of V∗ with the prover.
The development of quantum computation over recent years has significant potential in-
fluences on cryptography. Exponential speedups by quantum computers have been found for
problems that play a crucial role in current cryptographic systems. In the context of zero
knowledge, it is interesting to ask what would happen if one weakens the zero-knowledge
requirement to say that for x ∈ L a possibly dishonest Arthur learns nothing more after in-
teracting with the prover than what he could determine with a black-box quantum simulator,
with no interaction? Perhaps black-box quantum simulators are sufficiently more powerful
than classical ones that round-efficient protocols could exist for more interesting languages
L. After all, Watrous has given a black-box quantum simulator for the standard three-round
Graph Isomorphism protocol which succeeds with probability exactly one [W06], whereas clas-
sical simulators for the same protocol succeed with probability only approaching one. Perhaps
quantum exact simulators would be helpful in maintaining black-box zero knowledge under
parallel composition.
We note that constant-round AM protocols are particularly well-motivated in the quantum
setting, as Watrous has also shown that any language with an honest-verifier quantum sta-
tistical zero-knowledge protocol has a quantum statistical zero-knowledge AM protocol with
exponentially small completeness error and soundness error exponentially close to 1/2 [W02].
In this work, we prove that the quantum-simulator situation is analogous to the classical-
simulator situation studied by Goldreich and Krawczyk. Only BQP languages have constant-
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round AM protocols with negligible soundness error, which are black-box quantum simulation
zero knowledge.1
1.1 Techniques
Our proof is by exhibiting an efficient algorithm for the language L. For simplicity, assume a
three-round AM protocol for L, so the quantum simulator S outputs a transcript (A,B,C).
The first two outputs, A and B, are classical; and our arguments will not depend on whether
the third message is classical or quantum.
Idea of the algorithm: Choose H uniformly from a strongly (2t+1)-universal family of
hash functions, where t is S’s running time (i.e., the random variables {H(α)}α are uniform
and (2t+1)-wise independent). Run S on a verifier who replies deterministically H(α) to first
message α. Declare x ∈ L iff the honest verifier would accept the transcript (A,H(A), C).
This is nearly the same algorithm as used by [GK90], except (t + 1)-wise independence
sufficed in the classical case. Our algorithm is quantum because S is.
For x ∈ L, it can be verified that the algorithm accepts. The interesting case is when x /∈ L.
We show that if the algorithm accepts a string x /∈ L with probability ǫ, then there exists a
cheating Merlin who fools the honest Arthur with probability Ω(ǫ/t2). This contradicts the
protocol’s soundness being non-negligible for ǫ constant and t polynomial. (In the classical
case, the cheating Merlin’s success probability is ǫ/t, so a quantum black-box simulator can
be no more than quadratically more efficient.)
Indeed, the cheating Merlin simply sends Arthur α drawn from the distribution of A, S’s
first output message. He receives in response a uniformly random B′. If H(A) conditioned
on A = α is “well spread out,” then the distribution of Arthur’s response B′ can be closely
coupled with that of H(A)|(A = α) from S’s output. Therefore, if the algorithm likely accepts,
then sending γ according to C|(A = α ∧H(A) = B′) will likely fool Arthur.
The main technical lemma of our paper shows that for most α, H(A) conditioned on A = α
cannot be very concentrated (averaged over H). This is achieved via a reduction to black-
box search. Intuitively, no classical algorithm making t queries to a random oracle, and then
outputting one of the oracle’s responses, can concentrate the oracle to a set of fractional size
less than 1/t. It turns out that no quantum algorithm (nor in particular S) can concentrate
the oracle to a set of fractional size < 1/t2. Here, however, the search is structured, since
the black-box oracle is a hash function. However, we argue that with t queries, no quantum
algorithm can distinguish between a uniformly random oracle and a (2t+1)-wise independent
oracle, so lower bounds for unstructured search apply.
Our analysis of the algorithm is not analogous to the analysis of [GK90]. A first minor
difference is that we cannot construct a hash function on the fly as they do, because the
simulator’s queries can be in superposition. More importantly, their argument that if the
algorithm accepts an x not in L then there exists a cheating prover is essentially combinatorial;
it can be seen as inserting the honest Arthur into a random query round of the simulator. But
1As every BQP language has a zero-round protocol with a quantum verifier – trivially quantum-simulation
black-box zero-knowledge – this characterizes the class BQP.
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here, the simulator can make queries in quantum superposition even for messages which are
classical in the protocol, so it doesn’t make sense to insert the honest Arthur into a simulator
query. Our argument cannot rely just on classical combinatorics, but with a careful rephrasing,
it turns out that the analysis can be reduced to quantum search lower bounds.
Why does the algorithm use hash functions, instead of running the simulator on the honest
Arthur? The answer is that for x /∈ L, we still want to be sure that the simulator’s output
is fairly uniformly distributed, even conditioned on its first message. (Zero knowledge alone
only restricts the simulator’s behavior when x ∈ L.) Hash functions let us guarantee that the
second message is not too concentrated. Hash functions work well for the x ∈ L case, too,
because the transcript with a random hash function verifier is the same, on average over H,
as the transcript with the honest verifier.
Since the input to the search algorithm we generate is coming from a source of limited
independence, a technical contribution of this work is in showing that search is hard on average
for such inputs as well. The limited independence of the hash functions was necessary in the
first place to sample them efficiently.
1.2 Additional results and open problems
We also prove that no three-round interactive proof with a fully classical verifier and negligible
soundness error can be black-box quantum simulation zero knowledge, except for languages in
BQP – analogous to another result of [GK90] (for a black-box classical simulator and BPP).
The proof is similar to that for AM protocols, except now we run the simulator on deterministic
verifiers which use as their (private) random coins the hash of the prover’s first message.
Again, this in particular rules out parallel repetition of such protocols while maintaining
black-box zero knowledge. To our knowledge, no previous results on the parallel composition
of quantum zero-knowledge protocols were known. We show our results for computational zero
knowledge and therefore they apply as well for the stricter notions of statistical and perfect
zero knowledge.
Many open problems remain related to this work. We would like to be able to analyze
protocols with more “quantum-ness.” For example, what can one say about three-round in-
teractive proofs with classical messages but a quantum verifier? Here, the honest verifier may
not even have any private coins, but instead may use quantum mechanics to randomize. But
then there is nowhere for us even to put the output of a hash function! We would also like
to understand AM protocols in which all the messages are quantum. But then it is no longer
true that the honest-verifier transcript is the same as the average of the hash-function verifiers
transcripts. Hashing a quantum message collapses its state. (Note that the definition of zero
knowledge must also be changed for quantum verifiers – simulating the coins and transcript
is no longer enough, and the transcript may not even be well-defined. Instead, a proper defi-
nition requires the simulator to output the state of the verifier [W02]. However, in our paper,
the classical definition suffices because only the last message is allowed to be quantum.)
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1.3 Organization
We define our models in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3, we give the proof for three-round AM protocols,
up to technical Lemma 1 on concentration which is proved in Sec. 4. We then generalize
the three-round AM proof in two directions. First, we extend its validity to three-round IP
(private-coin) protocols in Sec. 5. Next, Sec. 6 generalizes to constant-round AM protocols,
requiring slightly more involved notation.
2 Preliminaries
Call a function δ negligible, δ ∈ negl(n), if for every polynomial p and for sufficiently large n,
δ(n) < 1/p(n).
2.1 Arthur-Merlin protocol
Definition 1. In a three-round Arthur-Merlin protocol 〈A,M〉 for language L, with the first
two messages being classical, (verifier) Arthur and (prover) Merlin are each given the input
x ∈ {0, 1}n. Then,
1. Merlin sends Arthur an α chosen from {0, 1}n1 according to some distribution.
2. Arthur replies with a uniformly random β ∈ {0, 1}n2 , independent of the first message.
3. Merlin sends γ and Arthur decides to accept or reject based on an efficient check on x
and the transcript (α, β, γ).
Here α, β and γ are polynomially long in n. Note that there are no efficiency requirements
on Merlin. Let 〈A,M〉(x) denote the distribution of protocol transcripts between Arthur and
Merlin.
The protocol satisfies, for some ǫC , ǫS > 0 with ǫC + ǫS < 1:
• Completeness: For x ∈ L, Pr(A accepts 〈A,M〉(x)) ≥ 1− ǫC .
• Soundness: For x /∈ L, then for any possibly cheating Merlin M∗,
Pr(A accepts 〈A,M∗〉(x)) ≤ ǫS.
A constant-round AM protocol is defined similarly – all of Arthur’s responses must be fair
and independent random coins.
In contrast to AM protocols, in a general interactive proof (IP) system (Sec. 5), the classical
verifier is allowed to flip private coins and to compute each of his responses as a function of
his coin flips.
In the proof of Theorem 1, it will not matter if γ is classical or quantum, nor if Arthur’s
acceptance predicate is classical or quantum. When we consider IP(3) protocols in Sec. 5,




A zero-knowledge proof for a language L is an interactive proof for L such that if x ∈ L, then
any verifier V∗ learns nothing more than the validity of the assertion that x ∈ L [GMR89,
GO93]. (Even “dishonest” verifiers not following the protocol – V∗ 6= V – are allowed.) The
notion of the verifier not “learning” more is formalized by exhibiting an algorithm S∗(x) called
the simulator which when x ∈ L produces the view (private coins and transcript) of V∗ at the
end of its interaction with the prover P, 〈P,V∗〉(x). More precisely,
Definition 2 (Zero Knowledge). A protocol with prover P is zero knowledge – either perfect,
statistical, or computational – on inputs from L and for verifiers in V, if: for every V∗ ∈ V,
there exists a probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm S∗ such that for all x ∈ L, the two
probability distributions S∗(x) and 〈P,V∗〉(x) are
1. the same (perfect zero knowledge), OR
2. statistically indistinguishable (statistical zero knowledge), OR
3. computationally indistinguishable (computational zero knowledge).
Black-box simulation zero knowledge is a stronger definition, requiring the existence of one
simulator S that uses any verifier only as a black-box oracle to produce its view.
(In the classical case, the zero-knowledge property concerns the distribution of possible
conversations between the prover and verifier from the verifier’s point of view. The important
property is that the verifier’s state after any messages can be efficiently reconstructed from the
transcript and private randomness. For protocols with quantum messages, or with a quantum
verifier, it is this property which should be maintained. We shan’t need them here, but for
precise definitions please refer to [W02,W06].)
2.3 Quantum oracle
A quantum oracle Uf for a function f : {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n2 is the unitary taking
|x〉|a〉|b〉 → |x〉|a⊕ f(x)〉|b〉 , (1)
for any x ∈ {0, 1}n1 , a ∈ {0, 1}n2 , and arbitrary b (⊕ is the exor operation). Note Uf is its
own inverse, so oracle access to Uf and U
†
f is no more powerful than oracle access to just Uf .
3 Main result
There exists H = H(2t + 1), a strongly (2t + 1)-universal family of efficiently computable
hash functions {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n2 [J74,WC81,CG89]. That is, for H chosen uniformly from
H, H(α) is uniformly distributed for each α ∈ {0, 1}n1 ; and the set of variables {H(α) : α ∈
{0, 1}n1} are (2t+1)-wise independent. For h ∈ H, let Ah represent a deterministic (dishonest)
Arthur who replies β = h(α) on message α. We prove:
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Theorem 1 (Main theorem). Let L be a language with a three-round Arthur-Merlin pro-
tocol 〈A,M〉 having completeness and soundness errors ǫC and ǫS, respectively. Assume
the existence of a quantum polynomial-time, black-box, computational-zero-knowledge simu-
lator S working for all 〈Ah,M〉 with h ∈ H(2t + 1), where S makes at most t queries. If
t
√
ǫS = o(1− ǫC − negl(n)), then L is in BQP.
In the case that γ is quantum, the simulator’s output must be quantum-computational zero
knowledge (i.e., indistinguishable under quantum-computationally efficient tests). In particu-
lar, if ǫS is negligible and ǫC a constant, then L ∈ BQP.
Theorem 1 follows from an analysis of algorithm Z in Claim 1.
Algorithm Z: Input x ∈ {0, 1}n, Output accept/reject.
1. Draw H uniformly from H(2t + 1). Run S on AH and
measure its output (A,B,C) = S(x,AH). (If the third
message is supposed to be quantum, then measure just A
and B.)
2. Accept if and only if Arthur A accepts the transcript
(A,H(A), C).
Claim 1. Algorithm Z runs in polynomial time, and satisfies:
1. For x ∈ L, Z accepts with probability ≥ 1− ǫC − negl(n).
2. For x /∈ L, Z accepts with probability q = O(t√ǫS).
Proof. Z is polynomial-time since S, choosing and evaluating a hash function in H, and
Arthur’s acceptance predicate are all efficient.
Note that the first step of Z constructs a joint distribution (H,A,B,C).
Case x ∈ L:














Pr[A accepts 〈Ah,M〉(x)]− negl(n)
= Pr[A accepts 〈A,M〉(x)]− negl(n)
≥ 1− ǫC − negl(n) .
At the first inequality, we merely add a check to each term, which can only reduce the prob-
ability. The second inequality follows from the computational zero knowledge assumption.
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Testing (h(α) = β ∧ A accepts (α, β, γ)) is efficient, so its probability on the simulated tran-
script (A,B,C), given H = h, can differ from its probability on the true protocol’s transcript
〈Ah,M〉(x) only negligibly (and h(α) = β on 〈Ah,M〉(x) by definition). Finally, since H is
drawn from a strongly (2t + 1)-universal hash family, in particular H(α) uniformly random
for each α. Therefore, the average of the transcripts 〈Ah,M〉(x) is distributed identically to
〈A,M〉(x) – in either case, Arthur’s message is uniformly random.
Case x /∈ L: We will show that if Z accepts some x /∈ L with probability q, then there exists
a cheating Merlin M∗ such that Pr(Arthur accepts 〈A,M∗〉(x)) = Ω(q2/t2). This along with
the soundness criterion implies:
ǫs = Ω(q
2/t2) ⇒ q = O(t√ǫS) .
Cheating Merlin M∗
Recall the joint distribution (H,A,B,C) defined in step one of
Z.
1. On input x, send an α drawn according to A.
2. On receiving Arthur’s uniform coins β, reply according to
C conditioned on A = α and H(A) = β. (If Pr[H(A) =
β|A = α] = 0, then give up.)
M∗ is not necessarily efficient, and need not be.
Intuitively, M∗ is only successful if the uniform distribution of β has sufficient overlap
with the distribution of H(A) from the simulator’s output, at least for most A. Then the
two distributions can be coupled, relating Arthur’s acceptance probability to q. (An extreme
counterexample might be that conditioned on A = a, H(A) were somehow fixed. Then β would
almost never agree with H(A), so M∗ wouldn’t know what to send for the last message.)
Now the zero knowledge property does not apply when x /∈ L, so it is possible that the
simulator’s output (A,B,C) could be very different from 〈A,M〉(x). Regardless, we show that
according to black-box query search lower bounds, H(A) is on average not too concentrated
even given A:
Lemma 1 (Search reduction). Let sα = maxβ Pr[H(A) = β|A = α]. Then
s ≡ E[sA] = O(t2/2n2) . (2)
The proof is in Sec. 4.
Corollary 1. Fix δ ∈ (0, 1]. From Markov’s inequality applied to Eq. (2), there exists a set
Good ⊆ {0, 1}n1 such that:
1. Pr(A ∈ Good) ≥ 1− δ.
2. For some constant c and all α ∈ Good, sα ≤ ct2δ2n2 .
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Pr[H(A) = β|A = α]/sα




Pr[A accepts (A,H(A), C), A ∈ Good]
≥ δ
ct2
(Pr[A accepts (A,H(A), C)]− Pr[A /∈ Good])
≥ δ
ct2
(q − δ) .
(3)
Here the first inequality uses the definition of sα from Lemma 1: Pr[H(A) = β|A = α] ≤ sα.
The second inequality, upper-bounding sα, follows from the definition of Good. Finally, we
used q ≡ Pr[Z accepts x] = Pr[A accepts (A,H(A), C)].
Set δ = q/2 to complete the proof of Claim 1, and thus also of Theorem 1.
4 Proof of Lemma 1 – Reduction to search
Lemma 1 is proved by reduction to search, then applying a search lower bound. The idea,
briefly, is to let βα be a string achieving sα. The simulator S outputs an A, with Pr[H(A) =
βA] = s. Now define a verifier oracle X by choosing each Xα uniformly at random and
independently. Let (AX , BX , CX) = S(x,X) the simulator’s output when run on X. Let s′
be the probability that XAX = βAX . By standard search lower bounds, the probability of this
event for any algorithm using t queries – and in particular for the simulator – is O(t2/2n2).
Finally, s′ = s because the hash functions have sufficient independence.
We elaborate the details of this sketch below.
Proposition 1. Fix a sequence (βα)α∈{0,1}n1 of elements of {0, 1}n2 . Let A ∈ {0, 1}n1 be the
(classical, random) output of a quantum algorithm A making at most t oracle queries to H,
a uniformly random hash function from H = H(2t+ 1). Then
s = Pr[H(A) = βA] = O(t
2/2n2) . (4)
(If A is a classical algorithm making at most t oracle queries to H, then s = O(t/2n2).)




Pr[H(A) = β|A = α] ,
where the probability is over the joint distribution of (H,A,B,C) from algorithm Z.
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Proof. The proof of Prop. 1 has two steps. First, we show that, because A makes at most
t oracle queries, we can forget about H being a strongly (2t + 1)-universal family of hash
functions, and instead just consider A run on a uniformly random function. Second, we give
a reduction from search.
Lemma 2. Let A = AH be the result of running a quantum algorithm A using t oracle queries
to H and measuring its output. Let A′ = AF be the measured output of A on F a uniformly
random function {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n2 . Then A and A′ have the same distribution.
Proof. The state of the quantum query algorithm A after t queries to (xα)α∈{0,1}n1 is∑
z
pz(x)|z〉 ,
where the coefficients pz(x) are polynomials in the binary variables xα,i with α ∈ {0, 1}n1 and
i ∈ [n2] ≡ {1, . . . , n2}. A block, for any fixed α, consists of the variables xα,i with i ∈ [n2].














Therefore, for a fixed oracle, the probability of measuring any particular output is a polynomial
of block degree at most 2t [BBC+98]. Averaging this polynomial over the oracle being H gives
the same probability as averaging over F by strong 2t-universality – in either case, the variables
xα are 2t-wise independent, uniformly random.
Therefore, Pr[H(A) = βA] = Pr[F (A
′) = βA′ ]. (We drew H from H(2t + 1) instead of H(2t)
because A need not have queried its output A.)
Now assume we are given a random instance of search with oracle access to a database X of
size 2n2 . That is, exactly one (uniformly random) position is marked 1 and the other positions
are marked 0. Standard search lower bounds imply that with t queries, the probability of
a quantum algorithm finding a 1 is O(t2/2n2) [BBC+98]. (For a classical algorithm, this
probability is of course O(t/2n2).)
A can be used indirectly as a search algorithm for the database X. Fix a uniformly
random function F : {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n2 . For each α ∈ {0, 1}n1 , fix a uniformly random
β′α ∈ {0, 1}n2 r {βα}. Then run A. When A makes a query to say α ∈ {0, 1}n1 , return βα if
XF (α) = 1 and β
′
α if XF (α) = 0. This response can be implemented in superposition, using at
most two oracle queries to X: choose βα or β
′
α depending on XF (α), then uncompute XF (α).
It is not necessarily efficient, except in terms of oracle queries. Finally, measure A’s output,




βα if XF (α) = 1
β′α if XF (α) = 0
,
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f is a uniformly random function, just as in Lemma 2, and finding βα in f implies finding a
1 in X. Therefore, Pr[F (A′) = βA′ ] = Pr[H(A) = βA] is exactly the probability that we find
a 1 in X using 2t queries. Search lower bounds imply Prop. 1.
5 Three-round protocols IP(3)
The extension of this result to a three-round interactive proof 〈V,P〉 is straightforward, and
follows the same lines as in Ref. [GK90]. In an interactive proof, the honest verifier V is given
random coins R at the beginning of the protocol, and replies to the prover’s message α with
β = VR(α).
For a hash function h : {0, 1}n1 → V’s coins, define the dishonest verifier Vh to respond
instead with Vh(α)(α) – i.e., Vh hashes the prover’s first message to generate its “randomness.”
Vh’s view of the interaction is therefore (α, γ).
Theorem 2. Assume language L has a three-round interactive proof with 1− ǫC = Ω(1) and
ǫS = negl(n). Assume the existence of a quantum polynomial-time, black-box, computational-
zero-knowledge simulator S working for all 〈P,Vh〉 with h ∈ H = H(2t + 1), where S makes
at most t queries. Then L ∈ BQP.
The proof of Theorem 2 is almost identical to that of Theorem 1, with only slight modifi-
cations to the algorithm and cheating prover.
Algorithm Z ′: Input x ∈ {0, 1}n, Output accept/reject.
1. Choose H uniformly at random from H. Run S on VH and
measure its output (A,C) = S(x,VH).
2. Accept if and only if the honest verifier with random coins
H(A), VH(A), accepts the transcript (A,VH(A)(A), C).
Note that by Lemma 2,
Pr
H,(A,C)=S(x,VH)
[VH(A) accepts (A,VH(A)(A), C)]
= Pr
F,(A,C)=S(x,VF )
[VF (A) accepts (A,VF (A)(A), C)] ,
where F is a uniformly random function {0, 1}n1 → V’s coins.
Cheating prover P∗
Define a joint distribution for (F,A,C) by (A,C) = S(x,VF ),
where F is a uniformly random function.
1. On input x, send α drawn from A.
2. On receiving β = VR(α) from V, reply according to C
conditioned on A = α and VF (A)(A) = β.
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The only significant difference is in the analog to Eq. (3). Now we sum over the coins r
instead of β. For the second inequality of Eq. (3) to go through, we need to prove that, for
any α and r,
Pr[Vr accepts (A,Vr(A), C)|A = α, VF (α)(α) = Vr(α)]
= Pr[VF (A) accepts (A,VF (A)(A), C)|A = α, F (α) = r] .
This is in fact the case since Vr sees the same distribution of transcripts (A,C) when condi-
tioned on F (α) = r as when conditioned on VF (α)(α) = Vr(α):
Lemma 3. For all r, α, α′ and γ′,
Pr[A = α′, C = γ′|F (α) = r] = Pr[A = α′, C = γ′|VF (α)(α) = Vr(α)] . (5)
Proof. S is a black-box simulator, so its outputs A and C are conditionally independent of
{F (α)}α∈{0,1}n1 given {VF (α)(α)}α. Since F ’s values are independent of each other, for any
fixed α, S’s outputs are conditionally independent of F (α) given VF (α)(α) – as asserted.
Note that previously, in the AM case, it did not matter whether the honest verifier Arthur
was quantum or classical. (By definition of AM, Arthur had to send only random coins, but his
final acceptance predicate could be quantum.) Here, however, it is essential that the verifier
be classical. If the honest verifier were quantum, then we might not be able to even define the
verifiers {Vh}, because there might not be any randomness locations into which to hash the
prover’s first message.
Also, while the three-round AM proof can be extended to constant-round AM protocols
(Sec. 6), that will not occur here. Our proof only works for constant-round IP protocols if the
honest verifier is guaranteed to use independent randomness to determine his response in each
round. It breaks down if he refers to the same randomness for different messages, because
then the black-box simulator’s output transcript need not only depend on the verifier’s first
message – i.e., it may depend directly on the randomness behind that message – so the analog
to Lemma 3 is false. In fact, assuming the existence of one-way functions, all languages in
NP have constant-round, computational-zero-knowledge protocols with (classical) black-box
simulators [GMW91].
6 Constant-round AM protocols
The result for three-round AM protocols extends to (2k + 1)-round AM protocols, k con-
stant. Messages will be written α1, α2, . . . , α2k+1, of respective lengths, n1, . . . , n2k+1. Assume
w.l.o.g. the first message is from M. For an indexed variable xi, let xj1 denote the j-tuple
(x1, x2, . . . , xj).
For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let Hi = Hi(2t + 1) be a strongly (2t + 1)-universal family of
efficiently computable hash functions {0, 1}Ni → {0, 1}n2i , with Ni = n1 + n2 + · · · + n2i−1.




(dishonest) Arthur who returns hi(α
2i−1
1 ) as the 2ith message when the transcript of the
first 2i − 1 messages is α2i−11 . Black-box access can be modeled by giving the simulator S
controlled-access to k oracles, evaluating the k hash functions (on arbitrary inputs). The
controlled oracle Uhi takes
|c〉|x〉|a〉|b〉 →
{ |c〉|x〉|a〉|b〉 if c = 0
|c〉|x〉|a ⊕ hi(x)〉|b〉 if c = 1
Equivalently, the simulator can be given a single oracle which takes as input also the round
number to apply the appropriate hash function. (This may be slightly stronger than merely
giving S k oracles, each one defined as an uncontrolled unitary as in Eq. (1) [AK06].)
Theorem 3. Assume language L has a (2k + 1)-round AM protocol, k constant, with 1 −
ǫC = Ω(1) and ǫS = negl(n). Assume the existence of a quantum polynomial-time, black-box,
computational-zero-knowledge simulator S working for all 〈Ahk
1
,M〉 with hk1 ∈ H1 × · · ·Hk,
where S makes at most t queries. Then L ∈ BQP.
Proof. Random variablesHi are uniformly and independently distributed over Hi. Let (A1, A3, . . . , A2k+1) =
S(x,AHk
1
), the simulator’s measured output for AHk
1
’s view – Merlin’s messages. Also let
A2 = H1(A1) and A2i = Hi(A
2i−1
1 ) – AHk
1
’s messages. Overall, we have a joint distribution
over (Hk1 , A
2k+1
1 ).
The algorithm Z draws from this distribution, and accepts if and only if A accepts the
transcript A2k+11 . Let
q ≡ Pr[Z accepts x] = Pr[A accepts A2k+11 ] .
For x ∈ L, Z accepts with good probability by the computational zero knowledge assumption
and by averaging over the hash functions, as before.
We will focus on the x /∈ L case. Define the cheating Merlin M∗: If the transcript so far
is α2i1 , M∗ sends the next message according to the distribution of A2i+1|A2i1 = α2i1 . If q is




1 ) = argmaxα2i Pr[A2i = Hi(A
2i−1







for some constant c. By Markov’s inequality, for δ ∈ (0, 1], there exists Goodi ⊆ {0, 1}Ni , such
that:
1. Pr[A2i−11 ∈ Goodi] ≥ 1− δ.





i=1 Goodi × {0, 1}Nk+1−Ni ; then Pr[A2k+11 ∈ Good] ≥ 1− kδ.
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Pr[A1 = α1] 12n2 Pr[A3 = α3|A21 = α21] · · · 12n2k Pr[A2k+1 = α2k+1|A2k1 = α2k1 ]












Pr[A2 = α2|A1 = α1]) · · · ( δct2 Pr[A2k = α2k|A2k−11 = α2k−11 ])
×Pr[A1 = α1] Pr[A3 = α3|A21 = α21] · · ·Pr[A2k+1 = α2k+1|A2k1 = α2k1 ]




















(q − kδ) .






1 )|A2i−11 = α2i−11 ] ≤ 1. (Compare to Eq. (3).) Setting δ = q/(k + 1), the cheating
probability is non-negligible (for constant k), completing our proof.
We remark that this proof would not have gone through had we defined A2i = Hi(A2i−1);
it is necessary to hash the entire preceding transcript A2i = Hi(A
2i−1
1 ), as in Ref. [GK90], in
order to put an upper bound on Pr[Ai = αi|Ai−11 = ai−11 ] ≤ Pr[Ai = αi(Ai−11 )|Ai−11 = ai−11 ].
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